The author focuses on the changes in the foreign policy of Japan which occurred against the background of basic transformations in the international relations of early 1970s triggered by the US transition to a more pragmatic policy in East Asia focusing on their own national interests.  After the ‘the Guam doctrine’ had been put forward by the US President Richard Nixon, the United States took a number of diplomatic steps that were perceived with the sense of psychological shock in Japan, causing certain complications in its relations with America. These steps included Nixon’s declaration in summer 1971 of his intention to visit communist China and the imposition by Washington of restrictive measures against the import of Japanese products. The paper concludes that the sense of shock was caused by the situation of ultimate information vacuum in which Japan found itself when Nixon was planning his visit to China. The reason for the US failure to inform Japan was their fear of a possible information leak, as well as lack of expertise on Japan in the US political leadership. The paper gives a detailed view of the political situation in Japan against the backdrop of ‘Nixon shocks’. The main attention is paid to the domestic struggle on the issue of restoring relations with China, as well as to the attempts of Sato cabinet to informally coordinate with Chinese leadership the conditions of the normalization of bilateral relations. The author insists that the launch of the normalization process was the result of not only of the shift in the US China policy, but of accumulating of a critical mass in the Japan-China relations. In particular, a large volume of bilateral trade had been reached, and there had occurred a qualitative shift in the Japanese public opinion in favour of restoring diplomatic relations with the PRC. The article reviews in detail the results of Prime Minister Tanaka’s visit to Beijing in September 1972, highlighting the Taiwan issue as a problem particularly painful for Japan. The author insists that in the final documents of the visit Japan managed to defend its position not to recognize Taiwan as an integral part of China. In future, Japan sought from America guarantees of protecting Taiwan from China’s attempts to settle the problem of reunification with Taiwan using military force. The article concludes that after the ‘Nixon shocks’ the Japanese diplomacy entered a new historical stage. Japan launched the ‘omnidirectional diplomacy’ – the policy of active development of relations with different countries and regions, based on Tokyo’s understanding of its own national interests that do not necessarily coincide with the interests of Washington. An important role was played by the psychological factor – the ‘Nixon shocks’ gave Tokyo a moral right not to inquire Washington on every occasion and pushed Japan to pursue a more independent course. However, the political alliance with America still retained its significance for Japan as the cornerstone of its foreign policy.