In the absence of a proper party system, factionalism lies at the heart of the interplay between the main political camps of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Along with the intricate state structure, factionalism delineates the contours of intra-elite competition and decision-making. Although there are no conventionally accepted designations of these factions, due to their fluctuant and accommodative ideological stances, presently, the IRI political spectrum is generally divided into four sectors: the Ultra-Conservatives, the Conservatives, The Moderates (Pragmatists), and Reformists. It should be noted that such composition is a result of the IRI political evolution since 1979 which has witnessed ideological differentiation, shifting alliances, and alteration of factions’ political platforms. In particular, members of the now-Reformist faction have undergone by far the most profound transformation, switching from bellicose Islamists in the 1980s to conciliative Democrats towards the end of the 1990s. This article explores the political genealogy of the Reformists with a focus on the process of moderation of their progenitor-faction – the Islamic Left. We outline the Islamic Left’s political path, conceptualize their political isolation, and examine the intellectual network that harbored their ideological transformation.

THE SPLIT WITHIN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AFTER THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980–1988)

In the course of the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the ensued period of a power struggle between various groups of the anti-Shah coalition, the Islamists had forced their political rivals out and gained full control over the Islamic Republic. However, the actual governing experience and adjustments of the new state soon proved to be a bone of contention among the post-revolutionary elites with the Parliament (Majles) being the main arena of ideological and political battles between rival camps. Concurrently, competing policy visions lead to the formation of the left and right wings of the Islamic Republican Party, which was created immediately after the Revolution and served for the Islamists as a bulwark against other groups. The Right chiefly represented the interests of large bazaari traders and higher clergy, opposed state interference in the economy, advocated the protection of private property, and were committed to strict observance of Sharia norms in the socio-cultural sphere. The Left mostly attracted the middle-rank clerics, radical student revolutionaries, and lower classes. They promoted more egalitarian economic policies, favored government redistribution of income, espoused less puritanical views on socio-cultural life, and argued for the export of the Islamic Revolution [Ravandi-Fadai, 2001, p. 71]. Apart from diverging opinions on economy and politics, the factions differed in their theological views as well. The Right adhered to a traditional reading of feqh¹, while the Left championed more dynamic and flexible interpretation. Furthermore, both flanks tried to legitimize their economic programs from the standpoint of Islamic law, accusing each other of supporting "American (capitalist)" or "communist" Islam respectively [Ayatollahi Tabaar, 2018, p. 207]. The endless debates over the land reform, taxes, state control over foreign trade and other economic issues had led to a stalemate between the right-dominated Guardian Council and the left-leaning Majles which virtually brought functioning of the state apparatus to a halt [Dunaeva, 2013, p. 33]. The competing factions were so intractable, that Ruhollah Khomeini, the Supreme Leader, often had to interfere himself to set the wheels of the state machine in motion. Eventually, R. Khomeini decided to suspend the activities of the IRP at the suggestion of then-president and party secretary Ali Khamenei and Majles speaker Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani on June 2nd, 1987 which was tantamount to the party’s effective dissolution [Movafeqat…, 1987]. The organizational separation of the IRP opposing flanks into the right-wing Combatant Clergy Society (CCS) and its left splinter Combatant Clergy Association (CCA) along with the end of the deadly Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and the death of R. Khomeini (1989) provided the opportunity for recalibration of foreign policy and shifts in domestic power alignment. In broad terms, the end of the 1980s could be characterized as the beginning of the “rationalization” of the legacy of the Islamic Revolution. Iran's leadership had gradually moved from revolutionary utopianism and radicalism to more realistic and pragmatic political practice both in internal affairs and in interaction with other countries. In this vein, the devastating Iran-Iraq War had a sobering effect on the proponents of the export of Revolution, while the most radical groups were pushed aside or eliminated in the post-revolutionary turmoil [Kozhanov, Bogacheva, 2020, p. 153]. Furthermore, Khomeini’s interpretation of the velayat-e faqih concept – a founding doctrine of the IRI – also gained a more mundane perspective. The utmost importance was now placed on the expediency of the state system even to the detriment of Islamic ordinances, with the Supreme Leader’s religious authority yielding precedence to his political function. After the death of R. Khomeini the state system was headed by the right-wing tandem – Ali Khamenei became Khomeini’s successor, while A.A. Hashemi-Rafsanjani replaced him as President. The main task facing the new leadership was to restore the country’s economy after the Iran-Iraq War so the course of stateization, which prevailed in the 1980s under the predominance of the left wing of the IRP, was replaced by a course towards building a market economy. Rafsanjani’s administration formulated the First Five-year Development Plan (1989–1994) which provided for inter alia liberalization of internal and external trade, export capacity growth, inducement of foreign investment, partial privatization, the establishment of free-trade zones, and refusal to subsidize unprofitable enterprises [Mamedova, 1997, p. 96]. After months of controversial disputes in the Majles, the Plan was eventually adopted in January 1990 and laid the legal basis for the country’s new economic program. Rafsanjani’s party fellows from CCS, though initially supportive of the reforms project, became wary of the detente foreign policy amidst the United States’ international hegemony after the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, they perceived the President’s course as a deviation from the ideals of the Revolution and soon took a more conservative and increasingly reactionary stance particularly during his second tenure (1993–1997), putting the matter of expediency of alliance with the Conservatives into question for Rafsanjani. Given that almost every action of the government was beset by an outburst of disaffection on the conservative side, the integrity of the reforms was inevitably sacrificed to the transient demands of the inter-factional struggle and political trade-off. The results were corresponding to such halfway reforms – the privatization process proceeded slowly and was limited to the sale of ordinary shares to private investors and large funds while maintaining state control, and a short period of increased economic growth ended with the onset of the debt crisis in the mid-1990s [Hakimian, Karshenas, 2005, p. 69,74].

THE EXPULSION OF THE ISLAMIC LEFT

The Left too were opposing the new economic policy. They feared that large bazaari traders would be the main beneficiaries of economic liberalization which in turn would strengthen the positions of the right. Moreover, they felt particularly bitter about obtaining outside loans, for they were convinced that this would increase the foreign debt and therefore undermine Iran’s sovereignty [Shadlu, 2007, p. 220]. Although leftists tried to get a foothold in the altered state architecture as an opposition party by criticizing Rafsanjani and his policy, their efforts were to no avail. Before 1989 they used to rely on their good standing with Khomeini and his younger son Ahmad for furthering their interests but with the change of leadership they lost this vital asset, while the 1989 constitutional amendments abolished the key executive post of prime minister held by the prominent leftist Mir-Hossein Mousavi almost for a decade. The loss of protection of the all-powerful Khomeini translated into arbitrary actions of the conservative Guardian Council against the Left. Previously, the Guardian Council had been instrumental for Khomeini’s followers in keeping their rivals – particularly the secular-minded liberal nationalists of the Freedom Movement of Iran – away from political offices immediately after the Revolution. However, after the death of Khomeini, the same strategy was deployed against the Left with the Council turning from a mere religio-legal control tool into a fully-fledged political filter [Maleki-Ahmadi, 2015, p. 82]. For the first time, the Council was unleashed against the Left in the run-up to the Assembly of Experts elections in 1991, when a number of heavyweight leftists were not allowed to participate. This in turn prevented the Left from presenting a full list of candidates and prompted them to boycott the elections altogether [Shadlu, 2007, p. 259]. The majority of the seats in the third Majles (1988–1992) were controlled by the Left and they were preparing to compete in the upcoming elections of 1992 under the aegis of the Combatant Clergy Association but faced an unprecedentedly massive wave of disqualifications of their candidates by the Guardian Council. This wave hit even some of the sitting parliament members with a total of 39 lawmakers banned from running, including the Majles Speaker Mehdi Karroubi [Sarabi, 1994, p. 97]. Prior to that, the Left were also ousted from the judiciary – the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Abdolkarim Mousavi-Ardebili resigned in 1989 and the Prosecutor General M. Mousavi-Khoeniha abandoned the office in 1991. The dissatisfaction of the Conservative Right with a less rigid and more open cultural policy led to the resignation of Culture minister Mohammad Khatami in 1992. Therefore, from 1989 to 1992 the Left had lost all the significant posts in every branch of power and found themselves on the margins of politics. Although the Right did exploit the Guardian Council to banish their rivals, it was the erosion of their social basis that determined the political marginalization of the Islamic Left. Iran had undergone dramatic social changes since the Revolution – the population had almost doubled from 33.7 million in 1976 to 60 million in 1996 with 60 percent being under the age of 24 due to the high fertility rate immediately after the Revolution, while the literacy rate had risen from 47.5 to 79.5 percent [Tazmini, 2009, p. 43]. The successful family-planning program and the mobilization of female volunteers for government initiatives enhanced the presence of women in the public sphere, including the labor market [Bahramitash, 2004, p. 39]. Economic liberalization fostered a new middle-class and in a broad sense gave Iranian society pluralistic impetus, while rapid urbanization created a more inclusive, consumeristic, and cosmopolitan urban culture, especially in Tehran during the tenure of Gholam-Hossein Karbaschi (1990–1998) [Bayat, 2013, p. 40]. All this resulted in the formation of an overwhelmingly young, educated, and restless social force alienated by ossified revolutionary sloganeering of the Left. In the global context due to the decline of socialism and proliferation of liberal ideas in the post-Cold War era, the Islamic Left had lost their appeal and were no longer seen as progressive forces. On the contrary, exhausted by the toils of the war and economic hardships, the Iranians saw leftist politicians as reactionaries opposing the normalization of relations with the West and hindering the country’s reconstruction. Their radical anti-imperialism and insistence on a centrally-controlled economy were incongruent with people’s aspirations and diminished their popularity and public trust, which in turn enabled the Guardian Council to brush them away. Thus, after the 1992 parliamentary elections, the Left were condemned to political marginalization, which prompted them to reflect on their post-revolutionary experience, place their political track record under scrutiny and optimize their ideological framework.

THE IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION